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1 Introduction
In broad terms, one can say that price discrimination exists when two “similar” products
which have the same marginal cost to produce are sold by a firm at diﬀerent prices.1 This
practice is often highly controversial in terms of its impact on both consumers and rivals.
This chapter aims to explain some of the main economic motives for price discrimination,
and to outline when this practice will have an adverse or beneficial eﬀect on consumers, rivals
and on total welfare.
Broadly speaking, there are three main reasons why competition policy may be concerned
with price discrimination. First, a dominant firm may “exploit” final consumers by means of
price discrimination, with the result that total and/or consumer welfare are reduced. Here,
the question that needs to be addressed is: in what circumstances does price discrimination
by a dominant firm have an adverse eﬀect on welfare? The answer to this, as will be clear in
this survey, often depends on the welfare standard that guides the application of competition
law. However, in practice competition authorities hardly ever concern themselves with price
discrimination as an exploitative device.
Second, and especially in Europe, it is sometimes a policy objective to attain a “single
market” across the region. Arguably, one manifestation of a single market is that a firm
does not set diﬀerent prices in diﬀerent regions, or at least it does not prevent arbitrageurs
∗I am very grateful to Paolo Buccirossi and John Vickers for comments. More technical and detailed
discussions of some of the material presented here is presented in Armstrong (2006). In preparing this
survey I have benefited from consulting the two earlier surveys by Hal Varian (1989) and Lars Stole (2006).
1There seems to be no consensus on a precise definition. Stigler (1987) suggests a definition that applies to
a wider class of cases: discrimination exists when two similar products are sold at prices that are in diﬀerent
ratios to their marginal costs. Which of these definitions we use makes no diﬀerence for the purposes of this
paper.
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reselling goods sourced in the low-price region to the high-price region. That is to say, firms
are often prevented from segmenting markets with a view to engaging in price discrimination.
In Europe, this concern has lead to a very hostile attitude by the authorities to attempts by
firms to prevent “parallel imports”, for instance.
Third, and perhaps most importantly from a competition authority’s point of view, we
may be concerned that price discrimination can be used by a dominant firm to “exclude”
(or weaken) actual or potential rivals. The question is in which cases price discrimination
can be an eﬀective way to put the buyer’s rivals (primary line injury) or the seller’s rivals
(secondary line injury) at disadvantage so as to force them to exit the market, or induce
them to compete less aggressively.
The appropriate antitrust treatment of price discrimination may require consideration of
more than one of these concerns. For instance, a form of price discrimination may poten-
tially be an eﬃcient way to supply services to final consumers, and yet it may also possess
exclusionary eﬀects. In such cases, competition law and policy needs to balance the risk of
preventing firms from pricing their products eﬃciently with the risk of permitting conduct
that leads to a less competitive market structure.
This chapter aims to explain some of the main economic motives for price discrimination,
and to outline when this practice will have an adverse or beneficial eﬀect on consumers,
rivals and total welfare. The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 outlines some of
the principal methods of price discrimination. Section 3 shows how the ability to engage
in price discrimination can sometimes lead to eﬃcient (e.g., marginal cost) prices, which
clearly leads to welfare gains. Section 4 discusses how price discrimination can open up new
markets or shut down existing markets. Section 5 examines when price discrimination causes
total output to rise or fall. Section 6 discusses when the introduction of price discrimination
will cause some prices to rise and other to fall, while sections 7 and 8 focus on less familiar
situations in which price discrimination causes all prices to fall or all prices to rise. Section
9 examines the impact of price discrimination on entry incentives. Section 10 introduces
dynamic price discrimination, while section 11 outlines the impact of price discrimination in
vertically-related markets.
The discussion throughout focusses on the underlying economics of price discrimination
and its impact on profits, entry, consumer surplus, and welfare. Where relevant, though,
particularly prominent anti-trust cases are mentioned as we go along.2
2 Forms of price discrimination
There are numerous business practices which fall under the heading of price discrimination.
First, consider static situations in which consumers buy all relevant products in a single
2Section 3.7 of Varian (1989) summarizes the origins of the legal approaches to price discrimination in the
United States, which initially focussed on protecting small retailers against large chain stores. For a survey
on the application to price discrimination of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, see Geradin and Petit (2005).
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period. In most markets, firms set the charge for purchase of their products by means of
a simple price per unit for each product, where these prices do not depend on who makes
the purchase. Such tariﬀs (i) are anonymous (they do not depend on the identity of the
consumer), (ii) do not involve quantity discounts for a specific product (i.e., there are no
“intra-product” discounts), and (iii) do not involve discounts for buying a range of products
(i.e., there are no “inter-product” discounts). Various forms of price discrimination are found
by relaxing restrictions (i)—(iii).
Non-anonymous price discrimination: This occurs when a firm oﬀers a diﬀerent tariﬀ to
identifiably diﬀerent consumers or consumer groups. When the tariﬀ also involves simple
per-unit pricing (rather than nonlinear pricing or bundling), this is the familiar case of third-
degree price discrimination. Examples of this practice include selling the same train ticket
at a discount to senior citizens, selling the same car at diﬀerent prices in two countries,
or selling the same drug at diﬀerence prices for human and animal use. Unless arbitrage
between consumer groups is very easy or competition between firms is almost perfect, we
expect that any firm, if permitted to do so, would wish to set diﬀerent tariﬀs to diﬀerent
groups. In antitrust cases this type of price discrimination can occur when the alleged abuse
consists in “selective price cuts” or “geographic price discrimination”.3
Another example of this form of price discrimination is first-degree price discrimination,
where each consumer is charged exactly her willingness-to-pay for the product(s). In its
purest form, the information needed for first-degree price discrimination makes it more of a
theoretical benchmark than a realistic business strategy. However, it provides a transparent
limit framework in which to discuss the possible eﬃciency gains from price discrimination,
as well as its distributional impact on consumers.
Quantity discounts: This occurs when the per-unit price for a specific product decreases
as the number of purchased units increases. A simple–and easy implemented–instance of
this is a two-part tariﬀ, whereby a buyer must pay a fixed charge in return for the right
to purchase any quantity at a constant marginal price. There are two distinct motives to
use nonlinear tariﬀs. First, nonlinear tariﬀs provide a more eﬃcient means by which to
generate consumer surplus. With linear pricing, the only way to make profit is to set prices
above costs, which entails deadweight losses. With a two-part tariﬀ, however, a firm can
extract profit using the fixed charge, while leaving marginal prices close to marginal costs
(which then maximizes the size of the “pie” to be shared between consumer and firm). This
role for nonlinear pricing exists even if all consumers are similar. A second role emerges if
consumers have heterogeneous tastes for a firm’s products. In this case, a nonlinear tariﬀ
can be used to sort diﬀerent types of consumers endogenously (so-called second-degree price
3Prominent antitrust cases in the European Union concerning selective price cuts and geographic price
discrimination are Irish Sugar and Compagnie Maritime Belge, for the first category, and United Brands
and Tetra Pak II for the second.
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discrimination).4 If some consumers gain higher utility from the product than others, then if
the firm oﬀers a tariﬀ where the marginal price declines with volume, it will typically make
higher profit than if it oﬀers the same marginal price to all consumers.5
Pure quantity discounts are generally not challenged by competition authorities if they
merely reflect cost eﬃciencies stemming from the larger volume of product sold (and are
therefore not discriminatory). However, at least in Europe, there is hostility towards dis-
counts oﬀered by a dominant firm which do not reflect costs.6 This approach, which seems
to be overly rigid, does not recognize the eﬃciencies that may stem from the pricing method,
independent of the cost eﬃciencies related to the scale of the transaction.
Bundling discounts: This occurs when the price for one product is reduced if the consumer
also buys another product. Two variants of bundling exist: (i) pure bundling is where a
consumer can only purchase the products as bundle and there is no scope for buying an
individual item, and (ii) mixed bundling, where the firm sets prices for a bundle and also for
individual items. In general, unless products have negligible marginal costs or are perfect
complements, pure bundling is a rather ineﬃcient business practice. The reason is that it
forces some consumers to purchase products for which their willingness-to-pay is smaller than
the cost of supply. Thus, we expect that “all inclusive holidays” will often be an ineﬃcient
way to market holidays, since eﬃciency requires that consumers only consume what they
value. In addition, we will see that pure bundling can provide a means by which to deter entry
by single-product firms. Mixed bundling (with two products) sorts consumers endogenously
into three groups: those with a strong taste for both products (who buy the bundle from the
firm), those with a strong preference for product 1 but weak preferences for product 2 (who
buy just product 1), and those with the reverse tastes (who buy just product 2). Mixed
bundling is closely related to two-part pricing: the “first” item from the firm is expensive,
while the “second” is relatively cheap. Indeed, since it is often hard to pin down what it
means for products to be “distinct”, in practice it may be hard to distinguish (intra-product)
quantity discounts from (inter-product) bundling discounts. (Should a season ticket for a
concert series, say, count as a quantity discount for purchasing several units of the same
product, or as a discount for purchasing several distinct items?)
Next turn to dynamic situations. There are several ways in which a firm can set diﬀerent
4However, there are plenty of examples of second-degree discrimination that are not to do with nonlinear
pricing. For instance, many retailers use coupons placed in newspapers to segment the market. It is plausible
that those consumers who take the trouble to cut out and use a coupon will also have more elastic demand,
and should therefore face a lower price. See Narasimhan (1984), for instance.
5See Tirole (1988, section 3.5.1), for instance.
6In its judgment in Michelin II the European Court of First Instance suggested that if discounts are
not based on cost eﬃciencies they should be regarded as in beach of Article 82. For further discussion of
competition law and policy towards quantity discounts and related practices, see Vickers (2005, section 2.4)
and the “Syposium on Loyalty Rebates”, Competition Policy International, volume 1, number 2, Autumn
2005.
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prices for essentially the same product over time. If consumers wish to buy a single item at
some point in time (e.g., a new novel), then a firm might be able to make those consumers
with a higher reservation price pay more than other consumers by setting a price for the item
which decreases over time. This inter-temporal price discrimination is essentially another
form of second-degree discrimination. A crucial diﬀerence between static and dynamic forms
of price discrimination is that, in the latter case, a firm may not have the ability to commit
to future prices. That is to say, once a firm has sold its product to the initial (enthusiastic)
pool of consumers, it typically has an incentive to reduce its price to extract profit from the
remaining, lower-value consumers. Indeed, in simple models, it turns out that the firm would
prefer not to have the ability to price discriminate in this way, but it cannot help but oﬀer
declining prices over time. This is the essence of the famous Coase (1972) problem faced
by firms selling to forward-looking buyers. In these situations, policy which forbids price
discrimination may have the eﬀect of endowing the firm with commitment power, with the
result that all prices can rise. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that competition authorities
have rarely investigated this type of dynamic price discrimination.
Other issues arise if consumers wish to purchase a product repeatedly (e.g., from a su-
permarket or an online retailer). In this case, a firm may be able to base its price today
on whether (or how much, or what) a consumer has purchased from it in the past. This
behaviour-based price discrimination is becoming increasingly prevalent due to the improved
technological ability to track consumer behaviour by means of the internet, loyalty cards,
and so on. This kind of price discrimination is a dynamic variant of nonlinear pricing, and
one which raises interesting and subtle issues. However, one diﬀerence with static nonlinear
pricing is that, in many cases, a firm does not announce its discounting strategy. Partly
this is because it would often be too complicated to describe its strategy–for instance, a
supermarket’s personalized vouchers to a particular consumer will depend upon his history
of purchases, and this will be impractical to communicate in detail. But partly there is
the commitment problem again. For instance, a supermarket may notice that a past cus-
tomer appears to have starting shopping elsewhere (his loyalty card has not been used, for
instance), and it may then decide to mail the consumer a financial inducement to return to
the shop. It is unlikely that the supermarket will wish to publicize such a strategy. In sum,
information about shopping habits presents firms with an ability to set “personalized” (i.e.,
discriminatory) prices. It is intrinsically hard to commit to such personalized prices.7
The final class of discriminatory pricing discussed involve the pricing of inputs to down-
stream firms. An issue of frequent anti-trust concern is the wholesale price a vertically-
integrated firm should be permitted to charge a downstream rival. When the firm sets too
high a wholesale price (relative to its own retail price), the firm might be said to “discrim-
7However, the information and commitment problems are sometimes less severe when the buyers are
downstream firms with which the seller has long-term relationships. In these cases the dominant seller may
oﬀer what in the antitrust jargon are sometimes referred to as “target rebates”. This practice conditions
the rebate to the meeting of a threshold based on the past purchases of the buyer. Target rebates have been
investigated in the cases Michelin I and II, British Airways and Irish Sugar.
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inate” against its rival. The interpretation of “too high” is not obvious, however, and this
issue is discussed later in the chapter. A second issue is whether a vertically-separate up-
stream supplier should be able to discriminate in its wholesale contracts among downstream
buyers. A major diﬀerence between supplying an input to downstream firms and supply-
ing a product to final consumers is that, in the former case, the contracts are often much
more complex and “personalized” than those typically oﬀered to final consumers. As such,
the contract with one downstream firm might not be known to a rival downstream firm.
This “secret deals” problem again raises the issue of credibility. We will see that if the
upstream supplier can oﬀer discriminatory deals to downstream firms, it may be forced to
oﬀer generous deals which ultimately benefit final consumers. But if public policy forbids
such discriminatory behaviour, this may restore the monopolist’s ability to set high prices
to its downstream buyers.
Regardless of the method of price discrimination, it is necessary that consumer arbitrage
not unravel the discriminatory prices. For instance, if a firm wishes to set a lower price in one
country it is important that consumers in higher-price countries not be able easily to import
the same product from the low-price country. (Prominent examples of price discrimination
by country include cars and pharmaceuticals.) Similarly, a season ticket holder should not be
able to let others use the season ticket, or consumers should not easily be able to pretend to
be new customers at a firm in order to take advantage of its introductory oﬀers. Therefore,
when policy makers wish to discourage price discrimination, they will often take the indirect
route of ensuring that consumer arbitrage is as easy as possible. For instance, as mentioned
earlier, European competition law is very hostile to firms preventing parallel imports of their
products when those firms are dominant or enter into anti-competitive agreements with other
firms.8
3 Price discrimination can lead to eﬃcient prices
In many cases, the welfare problems caused by firms exploiting their market power are due to
firms having insuﬃcient information about their consumers’ preferences, or being constrained
(by public policy, for instance) in their ability to condition prices on their information about
consumers. In some circumstances, allowing firms to engage in price discrimination can
implement eﬃcient prices. In these cases, total welfare is unambiguously improved, although
the impact on consumers may be negative.
One familiar example of this is first-degree discrimination, where a monopolist has perfect
8An important recent case is case C-53/03 Syfait v GlaxoSmithKline before the European Court of Justice.
This involved a pharmaceutical company wishing to prevent its products, which are sold at a low price in
Greece, from being re-imported into high-price countries. Advocate General Jacobs issued an opinion in
October 2004 that such constraints on parallel imports in this case should not necessarily be considered
abusive since the price diﬀerentials stemmed from state intervention in the prices for drugs in each country.
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information about each consumer’s willingness-to-pay for its product(s).9 To be concrete,
suppose there is a population of consumers, each of whom wishes to consume a single unit
of the firm’s product. Willingness-to-pay for this item is denoted v and this varies among
consumers according to the distribution function F (v). Thus, if a consumer has valuation
v and faces the price p, he will buy if v ≥ p. Suppose the firm has unit cost c. If price
discrimination is not permitted (or is otherwise not possible), the firm will choose its single
price p to maximize profit (p−c)(1−F (p)). Clearly, the chosen price will be above cost, and
total surplus is not maximized. (It is eﬃcient to serve all those consumers with v ≥ c, but
only those with v ≥ p > c are served.) If the firm can somehow observe each consumer’s v and
is permitted to discriminate on that basis, it will charge each consumer the maximum possible
(i.e., p = v) provided this price covers its cost of supply. In other words, an eﬃcient outcome
is achieved. However, the firm appropriates the entire gains from trade and consumers are
left with nothing. Thus, the benefits of allowing first-degree price discrimination depend on
the chosen welfare standard: with a total welfare standard such discrimination is beneficial,
whereas with a consumer standard it is not. Since it is rather common that the impact of
price discrimination on consumers is the opposite to its impact on overall welfare, this issue–
that policy towards price discrimination depends on the chosen welfare standard–appears
repeatedly in the price discrimination literature.
Another example of first-degree price discrimination involves two-part tariﬀs. Suppose
that the monopolist knows the utility each consumer gains from its product. Specifically,
suppose that a particular consumer has surplus u(q) − T if she consumes q units of the
product in return for a payment T . Consumers must receive a non-negative surplus if they
are to buy from the firm at all. If the firm has a unit cost c its profit-maximizing strategy
is to maximize T − cq subject to the consumer’s participation constraint u(q) − T ≥ 0.
This entails choosing q to maximize u(q) − cq so that total surplus from the interaction
is maximized. This outcome can be implemented by means of a two-part tariﬀ: the firm
sets the marginal price equal to marginal cost c and sets the fixed charge to extract all the
consumer’s surplus. (This fixed charge will diﬀer from consumer to consumer, depending
on their preferences u(·).) Again, this results in the eﬃcient level of consumption, while
consumers are left with no surplus.10
Monopoly first-degree price discrimination is merely an extreme form of a fairly common
situation. Lack of information about consumer tastes, in combination with market power,
leads to welfare losses as a firm faces a trade-oﬀ between volume of demand and the profit it
makes from each consumer. In many cases, if the firm can price discriminate more finely it
9Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) show how a monopolist supplying many products
can sometimes be in a position to practise (approximate) first-degree price discrimination, even if it does not
know the precise willingness-to-pay for any individual item.
10Price discrimination can also lead to eﬃcient supply to some consumers, if not all. For instance, in
standard models of nonlinear pricing, a profit-maximizing monopolist will ensure that those consumers with
the strongest tastes for its product will face a marginal price equal to the firm’s marginal cost. See Willig
(1978), for example.
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will be able to extract consumer surplus more eﬃciently, and this will often lead to greater
overall welfare. However, it is consumers’ private information that protects them against
giving up their surplus to a monopoly. Therefore, when a price-discriminating monopolist
has improved information about its consumers this will often lead to a reduction in consumer
surplus.
Competition between suppliers is another means by which consumers are protected
against surplus extraction. Therefore, even if firms know everything about a consumer’s
tastes, competition ensures the consumer will still be left with surplus. In competitive
environments, whether consumers are better or worse oﬀ when firms can practice price dis-
crimination is a subtle question, as we will see throughout this survey.
Consider for example the eﬀects of firms oﬀering two-part tariﬀs instead of linear prices.
(This discussion assumes that consumers buy all supplies from one firm or the other, i.e.,
there is “one-stop shopping”.) With linear pricing, firms’ prices will be close to their marginal
costs if the market is competitive, and prices will be higher when the firms have more market
power. When firms oﬀer two-part tariﬀs their marginal prices will usually be lower than
when linear prices are employed. For instance, in the special case where all consumers have
the same demand function, firms will sets marginal prices exactly equal to marginal cost,
since that is the most profitable method for a firm to deliver a particular level of consumer
surplus. Total welfare often increases if two-part tariﬀs are used instead of linear prices,
since the marginal price falls to cost. With more intricate analysis one can also show that
profit increases with this form of price discrimination, while consumers are typically worse
oﬀ.11 Thus, this competitive setting resembles the monopoly setting with two-part tariﬀs
just discussed: welfare and profits increase but consumers are harmed by the use of two-part
tariﬀs. The main eﬀect of competition here is that consumer surplus is no longer driven down
to zero when two-part tariﬀs are used. To confuse the issue, though, we will see alternative
situations in section 7 where the reverse happens: when competing firms know everything
about consumer tastes and price accordingly, firms are harmed and all consumers are better
oﬀ.
Finally, in the context of regulated monopoly, socially optimal prices almost always exhibit
price discrimination. Ramsey prices–the prices which maximize welfare subject to the
regulated firm covering its costs, including fixed costs–depend on demand conditions in
much the same way as an unregulated monopolist’s prices do. For instance, when the firm
serves a number of independent markets, each with the same marginal cost of supply, Ramsey
principles suggest that the most eﬃcient way to cover the firm’s production cost is to set
a higher price in those markets where consumer demand is less elastic, exactly as would be
the case with an unregulated profit-maximizing firm. In sum, socially optimal prices are
discriminatory whenever the regulated firm has fixed costs of operation which need to be
funded by price-cost markups.
11See Corollary 1 in Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Yin (2004). Armstrong and Vickers (2006) show
that these results extend to many situations where consumers have heterogenous demand functions.
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4 Price discrimination can open (or shut) markets
It is possible that permitting price discrimination will open markets that would otherwise not
be served at all. For instance, suppose a monopolist faces two independent markets, one of
which is “high value” and the other is “low value”. When discrimination is allowed, suppose
the discriminatory price in the high-value market is significantly higher than the choke price
which causes demand in the low-value market to fall to zero. Then, if the size of the high-
value market is suﬃciently large compared to the low-value market, when discrimination is
not allowed the monopoly will choose to serve only the high-value market. In such cases,
granting permission to discriminate results in a Pareto improvement: the strong market’s
price is unchanged while the weak market is served, which increases the surplus of consumers
in the weak market as well as the firm’s profit.12
A simple example of this phenomenon is the following. There are two kinds of consumer:
consumers in market 1 each wish to consume a single unit of the product and are willing to
pay up to 4 for this unit, while consumers in market 2 each wish to consume a unit and are
willing to pay 2 for this unit. Suppose the monopoly has no cost of production. In this case,
if the firm must charge the same price to both markets it will choose to set the price 4 and
serve only market 1 whenever there are more consumers in that market than in market 2. (If
there are more consumers in market 2 then the firm will prefer to set the price 2 and serve
all consumers.) If price discrimination is possible then the firm will set a price 4 in market
1 and a price 2 in market 2, and this results in a Pareto improvement.13
Another aspect of this issue is that the higher profit which price discrimination generates
can provide a more eﬀective way for a firm to cover its fixed costs. In some cases, a monopoly
might be profitable overall if it can price discriminate but unprofitable if it cannot. A
broadcaster, for instance, might only be profitable if it can bundle its channels together, or
a rail operator might only be able to break even if it can discriminate between low income
and other travellers. In such cases, all markets would be shut down if price discrimination
were not allowed.
Further examples of how the introduction of price discrimination might open or shut a
market involve nonlinear pricing. Suppose there are two groups of consumers, high-value
users and low-value users, and the firm cannot distinguish between the two groups directly.
12See Layson (1994) for formal analysis along these lines. We follow the literature and say that a market
where the price rises with discrimination is a “strong” market while a market where the price falls is a “weak”
market.
13Note that a variant of this example shows that price discrimination can sometimes cause markets to
shut down. Suppose there is a third intermediate market where consumers have a valuation of 3 for a
unit. Suppose 50% of consumers are in market 1, 10% are in market 3 and 40% are in market 2. Without
price discrimination, one can show that the best strategy for the firm is to set a price of 2 and to serve all
consumers. Suppose next that the firm can distinguish only two groups of consumers, those in market 1 and
those who are in either market 2 or 3. One can show that the optimal strategy for the firm is set a price of
2 to those in market 1 and to set a price of 4 to those in market 2/3. Thus, permitting price discrimination
causes the firm to abandon market 3, and this causes welfare to fall.
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Both types of consumer potentially wish to consume up to two units of the product. Low-
value users have utility of 2 from their first unit and further utility of 1 from the second
unit. High-value users have utility twice as high: their utility is 4 from the first unit and
2 from the second unit. The fraction of high-value users among the consumers is λ, say. If
production is costless, when the firm sets a linear price the profit-maximizing price is p = 2
(regardless of the fraction λ). With such a price, the low-value users consume a single unit
while the high-value users consume two units. Suppose next that the firm sets a nonlinear
tariﬀ, and say its price for a consumer’s first unit is p1 while its price for a subsequent unit
is p2. Then one can show that the profit-maximizing nonlinear tariﬀ is p1 = 2, p2 = 1 if
λ < 1
2
and p1 = 4, p2 = 2 if λ > 12 . Thus, when low-value users are more numerous, the
introduction of nonlinear pricing causes the low-value users to consume two units, which
is eﬃcient. This results in a Pareto improvement compared to linear pricing. However,
when high-value users are more numerous, the optimal strategy for the firm is to exclude
the low-value users completely so as to fully extract the high-value surplus. Total welfare
decreases in this case compared with linear pricing, and all consumers are weakly worse oﬀ.
In particular, this simple example shows that nonlinear pricing has an ambiguous eﬀect on
welfare relative to linear pricing.
While a consideration of when markets open or shut due to price discrimination does
oﬀer some insights–in particular, the possibility of Pareto improvements is an uncontrover-
sial benefit of price discrimination–this analysis does not take us very far. For instance,
the welfare diﬀerence between a market being shut down and being open a tiny bit is not
significant. Moreover, in practice markets are rarely completely shut down when price dis-
crimination is banned. (In virtually all countries, there is someone who is willing to pay
almost any price for a luxury car or a pharmaceutical product.) For this reason, in the next
section we discuss the eﬀect of price discrimination on total output.
5 The eﬀect of price discrimination on output
A focus of earlier work on price discrimination has been on its eﬀect on output. If diﬀerent
products have diﬀerent (marginal) prices when those products have the same marginal cost,
then total output is sub-optimally distributed from a social welfare perspective. However, it
might be that output increases when firms are permitted to engage in price discrimination,
and this eﬀect might be suﬃcient to outweigh the undesirable “unequal marginal utilities”
eﬀect. Using this insight one may deduce that if price discrimination does not lead the firm(s)
to expand output, it will cause welfare to fall.14 However, this does not tell us much in the
event that discrimination causes total output to rise, since welfare might then be higher or
14The eﬀect of discrimination on total output was perhaps first studied by Robinson (1933). Schmalensee
(1981) shows that if demands for the products are independent and marginal costs are constant, then if welfare
increases with discrimination it must be that total output increases. Varian (1985) extends this argument
to allow for cross-price eﬀects, and Schwartz (1990) extends the argument to nonlinear cost functions.
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lower. Thus, using changes in output as a test for the welfare eﬀects of price discrimination is
capable only of delivering bad news. Moreover, outside some classroom examples, it is rarely
easy to find conditions that characterize when output rises or falls with discrimination,
and very detailed knowledge of consumer demand is needed to formulate accurate public
policy.15 However, if the firm is regulated the comparison is sometimes easier. For instance,
Armstrong and Vickers (1991) and Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1995) show that with
common forms of average price regulation, total output necessarily increases if the firm is
permitted to engage in price discrimination. As already emphasized, however, this does not
imply that price discrimination will be welfare improving.16
Another insight is that if the strong market is also the large market, then allowing price
discrimination is often good for output and welfare. To see this, consider the following
example.17 Consumers each wish to purchase a single unit of a monopolist’s product. Con-
sumers either have a high valuation vH for the unit or a low valuation vL < vH . There
are two markets, 1 and 2, and the fraction of the consumers in market i who have a high
valuation is λi. Suppose that λ1 ≥ λ2, so that market 1 has the greater proportion of
high-value consumers. Suppose that production is costless. If the firm is able to practice
third-degree price discrimination across the two markets, it will set a high price vH in market
i if λivH ≥ vL, and otherwise it will set the low price vL. If the firm cannot discriminate, it
will base its price on the overall fraction of high-value consumers across the two markets. If
a fraction β of all consumers are in market 1, the overall fraction of high-value consumers is
λ¯ = βλ1+(1−β)λ2. If the proportion of high-value consumers is similar in the two markets,
so that the discriminating firm would like to set the same price in the two markets (either
both high or both low) then clearly policy toward discrimination has no impact on prices.
However, if the distribution of consumers is quite asymmetric, in the sense that
λ1 >
vL
vH
> λ2 ,
the discriminating monopolist would set a high price in market 1 (the strong market) and
a low price in market 2 (the weak market). In this case, policy which prohibits price dis-
crimination will certainly have an eﬀect on prices. If the weak market is the larger market,
15When consumer demands are linear, and if no markets are opened as a result of price discrimination,
it is well-known that output is not aﬀected by price discrimination, and hence that discrimination causes
welfare to fall. Schmalensee (1981, p. 245) concludes “If all demand functions are strictly concave or convex
and the pi’s [the discriminatory prices] are not nearly equal, there is apparently no simple, general way to
tell if monopolistic discrimination will raise or lower total output.” However, see Cowan (2006) for more
progress in this direction.
16An interesting case involving price discrimination and total output is Competition Commission (1999).
In 1999, the supply of milk in the UK was fixed by European quotas. One distributor, Milk Marque, held
nearly a 50% market share, and was heavily engaged in price discrimination to its buyers. Since its total
output was fixed via the quota arrangements, this discriminatory pricing was likely to harm welfare. This
factor was an important part of the Competition Commission’s case against Milk Marque.
17This is taken from Hal Varian, “A Big Factor in Prescription Drug Pricing: Location, Location, Loca-
tion”, The New York Times, 21 September 2000.
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in the sense that λ¯ < vL/vH , the non-discriminating firm will choose to set a low uniform
price. This will increase consumer surplus and total welfare relative to the situation with
price discrimination. On the other hand, if the strong market is the larger market, in the
sense that λ¯ > vL/vH , the firm will respond to a ban on discrimination by setting a high
price to everyone. This will harm consumers in the weak market, and lower total welfare.
In sum, when a weak market–a market with relatively few high-valuation consumers–is
also a relatively small market, then price discrimination is likely to help consumers in this
market and improve overall welfare. This suggests that a per se ban on price discrimination
by country is too blunt a policy.
Extending this monopoly analysis to situations of oligopoly does not usually make the
eﬀect of price discrimination on output easier to predict, since one must consider firm-level
elasticities as well as market elasticities.18 One exception to this occurs in Armstrong and
Vickers (2001, section 4). Here the focus is on the competitive limit where prices are close
to marginal cost, and it is shown that if the weak market is also the market with lower
market elasticity then total output falls with discrimination, and hence so does welfare.
In competitive environments, firms might be forced to set a lower price in the “wrong”
market (i.e., in the less elastic market) since firm-level elasticities might diﬀer drastically
from market-level elasticities. By contrast, with monopoly the firm generally sets high prices
in the correct (inelastic) markets.
6 When does price discrimination cause some prices to
rise and others to fall?
It is intuitive in many situations that when a firm is permitted to engage in price discrimina-
tion some of its prices will fall while others will rise. That is to say, the non-discriminatory
price is some kind of “average” of the discriminatory prices.
Consider first the case of monopoly supply. Suppose a monopolist serves two markets,
1 and 2, which have independent consumer demands. The firm’s profit in market i when it
sets the price pi in that market is denoted πi(pi). Then the profit-maximizing discriminatory
prices are characterized by π0i(pi) = 0, while the profit-maximizing uniform price p satisfies
π01(p) + π02(p) = 0. Except in the fluke case where there is no gain from discrimination, it
follows that in one market i we have π0i(p) < 0 and in the other market π0j(p) > 0. Assuming
profit functions are single-peaked it follows that if the monopoly can price discriminate it
will lower its price in market i and raise its price in market j.
Matters are more complicated when there are competing suppliers. As emphasized in
Corts (1998), the chief diﬀerence with monopoly is that a market might be strong for one
firm but weak for its rival. In such cases price discrimination can cause all prices to fall, as
discussed in section 7 below. However, when firms do not diﬀer in their judgement of which
18See Holmes (1989), for example.
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markets are strong, Corts shows that when price discrimination is permitted, prices will rise
in the market which both firms view as strong and prices will fall in the market which both
firms view as being weak. (Corts uses the term “best-response symmetry” when firms agree
about which market is strong and which is weak.) Armstrong and Vickers (2001, section
4) and Armstrong (2006, section 3.2) provide simple examples of best-response symmetry
where price discrimination causes some prices to rise and other to falls. In both examples,
industry profit rises when discrimination is permitted, while consumer surplus falls.
The discussion in this section has considered only the case of third-degree price discrim-
ination so far. Consider next a monopoly bundling example.19 There are two products, 1
and 2, provided by a monopolist. Consumers are characterised by their valuations v1 and
v2, where vi is a consumer’s valuation for product i. Suppose that her valuation for con-
suming both products is just the sum v1 + v2. In general, the firm sets three prices: p1 is
the firm’s price for product 1 alone, p2 is the price for product 2 alone, and p12 is the price
for the bundle of products 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the resulting pattern of demand (when
p12 < p1 + p2).
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Figure 1: Pattern of Consumer Demand with Monopoly Bundling
Suppose the marginal cost of supplying either product is zero and consumer valuations
(v1, v2) are uniformly distributed on the unit square [0, 1]2. If bundling is not possible (i.e.,
19Two key papers on monopoly bundling are Adams and Yellen (1976) and McAfee, McMillan, and
Whinston (1989).
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p12 = p1+p2), the profit-maximizing price for each product is 12 and the firm makes profit of
1
2
. If the firm is able to price discriminate by means of oﬀering a discount for joint purchase
(p12 < p1+p2), one can show the profit-maximizing prices are p12 = 43−
1
3
√
2 ≈ 0.862 for the
bundle of two products and p1 = p2 = 23 for each stand-alone product. Thus the price for joint
consumption is lower than with unbundled pricing, while the price for a single item is higher.
In this example at least, then, the market for joint consumption is the weak market, while the
market for individual consumption is the strong market. This pricing policy results in profits
approximately equal to 0.55, which is 10% higher than the profit without bundling. One
can calculate that aggregate consumer surplus with this mixed bundling policy is given by
0.255, which compares to 0.25 with independent pricing. Thus, aggregate consumer surplus
also increases (slightly) when mixed bundling is used, although those consumers with strong
taste for one product but not the other are worse oﬀ with the bundling policy since they
constitute the strong market. Again, then, we see that price discrimination is not necessarily
harmful to consumers or welfare, even in a monopoly context.
7 How price discrimination can intensify competition
Perhaps surprisingly, there are several situations where permitting firms to engage in price
discrimination causes all prices to fall, so that competition is intensified. The examples
discussed here fall into two categories: models where firms discriminate on the basis of
consumer brand preferences, and models of competitive bundling. We discuss these in turn.
(Further situations in which price discrimination leads to tougher competition are found in
the dynamic context presented later in section 10.)
Following the analysis of the previous section, consider cases where firms diﬀer in their
view of which markets are strong and which are weak. Corts uses the term “best-response
asymmetry” for these cases.20 Take for example the model of Thisse and Vives (1988). There
are two firms in a Hotelling market. Suppose first that firms can observe each consumer’s
location (or brand preference), and can price accordingly. A firm will then set a relatively
high price to nearby consumers in order to exploit those consumers’ unwillingness to travel
so far to the other firm, so that its nearby consumers constitute a firm’s strong market. In
particular, one firm’s strong market is the other’s weak market. In equilibrium, consumers
purchase the product from the preferred firm, which is eﬃcient, and those consumers who
are almost indiﬀerent between the two brands will obtain the best deal. If firms must set a
uniform price to all consumers, however, Thisse and Vives show that this uniform price can
be above all the discriminatory prices. Thus, when there is best-response asymmetry it is
possible that all prices decrease with price discrimination. In this model, price discrimination
20Nevo and Wolfram (2002) present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that price discrimination
via coupons in the breakfast cereal market exhibits best-response asymmetry, and that the introduction of
coupons leads to a fall in all prices. They also document how firms allegedly colluded to stop the use of
coupons.
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has no impact on total welfare since all consumers just wish to buy a single unit, and they
buy this unit from the closer firm with either pricing regime.21 All consumers clearly benefit
from price discrimination. Firms, however, make lower profits when they engage in this form
of price discrimination compared to when they must oﬀer a uniform price.22 As Thisse and
Vives (1988, page 134) put it:
“denying a firm the right to meet the price of a competitor on a discriminatory
basis provides the latter with some protection against price attacks. The eﬀect is
then to weaken competition, contrary to the belief of the proponents of naive ap-
plication of legislation prohibiting price discrimination like the Robinson-Patman
Act.”
The fact that firms might be worse oﬀ when they practice price discrimination is one of
the key diﬀerences between monopoly and competition. Ignoring issues of commitment for
now (see section 10.1 below), a monopolist is always better oﬀ when it can price discriminate:
the firm is free to choose a uniform price when discrimination is permitted but in general it
is better oﬀ setting diﬀerent prices. In the same way, an oligopolistic firm is always better oﬀ
if it can price discriminate compared to when it cannot, for given prices oﬀered by its rivals.
However, as in many instances of strategic interaction, once account is taken of what rivals
too will do, firms in equilibrium can be worse oﬀ when price discrimination is permitted.
Firms then find themselves in a classic prisoner’s dilemma.
We turn next to examples concerning bundling. The first such example is taken from
Matutes and Regibeau (1992), where two symmetric firms each oﬀer a version of two prod-
ucts. Consumers wish to purchase one unit of both products. (These two products could be
purchased from the same firm or from two diﬀerent firms.) In a specific example, Matutes
and Regibeau show that when firms are able to oﬀer a discount for joint consumption, the
firms’ prices are uniformly below the equilibrium prices without bundling. Of course, each
firm’s profit then falls when bundling is employed. Clearly, consumers are all better oﬀ as a
result of the price reductions caused by price discrimination. However, there is excessive loy-
alty: because of the bundle discount too many consumers buy both products from the same
21As ever, one should be wary of reaching policy conclusions on the basis of these unit demand models
since price levels have little role to play in welfare terms. If consumers had elastic multi-unit demands, price
reductions have a beneficial welfare impact. In addition, if firms have imperfect information about brand
preferences, price discrimination may induce some consumers to buy from their less preferred supplier. For
instance, Bester and Petrakis (1996) consider a model where firms only know whether a consumer prefers it
to its rival, but not by how much. In this model, firms set lower prices to those consumers who are known
to prefer the rival brand, with the result that those consumers who are almost indiﬀerent between the two
brands will prefer to buy from the (slightly) less preferred supplier in return for the reduced price. A similar
feature appears in dynamic models of price discrimination in section 10.
22Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Tschantz (2005) use a variant of this model to argue that mergers are less
likely to be detrimental when firms practice spatial price discrimination than when they do not.
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firm than is eﬃcient, and so welfare falls with this form of discrimination.23 ,24 The economic
reason why mixed bundling acts to intensify competition is rather subtle, and awaits further
clarification. (It cannot be anything to do with best-response asymmetry, since firms do not
view the various kinds of consumer as strong or weak in diﬀerent ways.)
The final examples in this section involve a multi-product firm facing a single-product
rival. I discuss two such examples. The first one involves pure bundling and the second
involves third-degree price discrimination. Consider first this bundling example.25 Suppose
there are two products, 1 and 2, and each consumer potentially would like a unit of each
product. Firm A supplies both products and holds a monopoly over product 1, while firm
B supplies a variant of product 2. Suppose consumers have additive utility for the two
products. Suppose consumers have homogeneous preferences for product 1, and all have the
same reservation value, v1, for this item. The two firms supply imperfectly substitutable
versions of product 2, and if firm A sets the (unbundled) price pA2 while B sets the price
pB2 , firm A’s product 2 demand is qA2 (pA2 , pB2 ) and B has demand qB2 (pA2 , pB2 ). Firm A has
marginal cost cA1 < v1 for product 1 and marginal cost cA2 for its product 2, while B has
marginal cost cB2 for its product 2. Then A’s profit from product 2 is (pA2 −cA2 )qA2 (pA2 , pB2 ) and
B’s profit is (pB2 − cB2 )qB2 (pA2 , pB2 ). Given that A sets unbundled prices, its most profitable
response to B’s price pB2 is denoted pA2 = RASEP (pB2 ) and similarly B’s best response to A’s
price pA2 is denoted pB2 = RB2 (pA2 ). When firm A sets unbundled prices for its two products,
the prices for product 2 are determined by the intersection of these two reaction functions,
as depicted by γ on Figure 2. (Firm A sets the monopoly price pA1 = v1 for product 1.)
Next, suppose firm A commits to sell its two products as a pure bundle, while prices are
determined in a second stage. Say that firm A’s price for the bundle is pA12. A consumer
deciding whether to buy from firm A or firm B knows that when she buys from A she
obtains an extra utility v1 due to the additional consumption of product 1. Therefore, firm
A’s “eﬀective price” for product 2 is pA2 = pA12 − v1, and the demand for A’s bundle is just
qA2 (pA12 − v1, pB2 ). Firm A’s total profit is
(pA12 − cA1 − cA2 )qA2 (pA12 − v1, pB2 ) = (pA2 − [cA2 − {v1 − cA1 }])qA2 (pA2 , pB2 ) .
23A variant of this model involves the two firms having to choose between separable pricing and pure
bundling. In this case, firms’ profit also falls in many cases when firms choose to sell their products only as
a bundle, and typically if falls by more than when mixed bundling is employed. See Matutes and Regibeau
(1988) and Economides (1989) for this analysis.
24The example analyzed in Matutes and Regibeau (1992) is extended in Armstrong and Vickers (2006)
to allow for asymmetric products, non-uniform distributions, correlation in brand preferences, and shopping
costs for purchasing from more than one supplier. They show in this more general framework that mixed
bundling continues to harm profit and welfare, and to boost consumer surplus, relative to linear pricing.
However, they also extend the bundling model to allow for elastic, multi-unit demand for each product,
in which case the impact of price discrimination on profit, welfare and consumer surplus is shown to be
ambiguous.
25This is essentially Example 2 in Whinston (1990). For more detailed discussion of the Whinston model
and the literature that follows, see Neven (2007).
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This is similar to its profit from product 2 when there is unbundled pricing, except that
its cost cA2 is shifted down by {v1 − cA1 }. Therefore, firm A’s most profitable eﬀective price
pA2 , given B’s price pB2 , which is denoted pA2 = pA12 − v1 = RABUND(pB2 ), is shifted downwards
compared to the case of unbundled pricing. The (eﬀective) prices for product 2 are now
located at β on Figure 2, which are lower for both firms. Typically, both firms’ profits fall
when firm A oﬀers its products as a bundle. Therefore, when there is an existing firm in
market 2–so that entry deterrence is not an issue–in this particular model we would not
expect the multi-product firm to choose to sell its products as a bundle.
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Figure 2: The Strategic Eﬀect of Pure Bundling
Why does bundling by the multi-product firm lead to more intense competition? As
explained by Whinston (1990, page 884), when firm A bundles its products, in order to
make profitable sales of its monopolized product 1, it must also make sales of its product
2. This leads it to cut price in an eﬀort to take sales away from firm B, an eﬀect Whinston
terms “strategic foreclosure”. However, whether this strategic foreclosure eﬀect operates or
not depends on the details of the model, as we will see in section 8.
A closely related model, involving third-degree discrimination instead of bundling, is
the following.26 Suppose firm A serves two independent markets, 1 and 2. Market 1 is
26See Armstrong and Vickers (1993) for formal analysis. This paper also argues that the eﬀect of allowing
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monopolized by firm A, whereas in market 2 there is a rival firm B. If firm A can price
discriminate in the sense that it may oﬀer selective price cuts and set distinct prices in the
two markets, it will set the monopoly price in market 1, while prices in market 2 will be
determined by the competitive interaction between the two firms. On the other hand, if firm
A cannot set diﬀerent prices in the two markets it will have to trade oﬀ the benefits of setting
a low price in the competitive market versus a high price in the captive market. In particular,
if firm A prefers to set a higher price in the captive market than in the competitive market,
so that the former is firm A’s strong market, the eﬀect of a ban on price discrimination is to
reduce the price in the captive market and to raise prices in the competitive market. The
profit of the single-product rival clearly increases when such a ban is imposed, while the
eﬀect on firm A’s overall profit is not clear-cut.27
8 How discrimination can relax competition
There are a variety of ways in which price discrimination can act to relax competitive pres-
sures in the markets, to the detriment of consumers.28
When a multi-product firm faces a single-product rival, it is possible that bundling can act
to reduce the intensity of competition.29 To see this, suppose again there are two products,
1 and 2. Firm A supplies both products while firm B can supply only product 2. The two
firms here oﬀer identical versions of product 2. A consumer has valuation v1 for product 1
and v2 for product 2 (and valuation v1 + v2 for both products). Suppose the firms’ costs of
supply are normalized to zero. For simplicity, suppose that (v1, v2) is uniformly distributed
on the unit square [0, 1]2. Then, if firm A sets unbundled prices for its two products it will
set the monopoly price pA1 = 12 in its captive market. All profits are competed away for
product 2, and that product’s price is equal to zero. Therefore, with unbundled pricing firm
A’s profit is 1
4
, while firm B makes nothing.
Suppose instead that firm A commits to bundle its two products together, prior to the
two firms choosing prices. Firm A sets a price pA12 for its bundle, while firm B sets the price
pB2 for its product. Figure 1 depicts the pattern of consumer demand (where pA1 =∞). By
calculating the areas in the figure, one can calculate the equilibrium prices are approximately
price discrimination on the intensity of competition is exacerbated when the multi-product firm is regulated
and operates under an average-price constraint. (If it reduces its price in the competitive market it can then
raise its price in the captive market.)
27Dobson and Waterson (2005) present a related model where a national retailer operates in a number
of markets, in some of which it is the sole supplier and in the remainder of which it faces a single local
competitor. They show that it is possible for the chain store to benefit if it commits to a national pricing
policy (i.e., if it does not price diﬀerently depending on competitive conditions in each local market).
28See Buccirossi (2007) for a fuller account of “collusive” practices.
29This bundling example is taken from Section III.E of Nalebuﬀ (2004). See section II of Whinston (1990),
Carbajo, De Meza, and Seidman (1990) and Chen (1997a) for earlier analyses.
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pA12 ≈ 0.61 ; pB2 ≈ 0.24. Therefore, all prices rise compared to the situation in which firm
A sets unbundled prices. In eﬀect, bundling helps to diﬀerentiate the two firms’ oﬀerings:
firm A oﬀers a superior “product” (by virtue of its additional product 1 in the bundle). The
respective profits of the two firms are approximately πA ≈ 0.367 ; πB ≈ 0.067, which are
also both higher compared to when firm A prices its products separately. This example, in
combination with the discussion of theWhinston model in the previous section, indicates that
the eﬀect of bundling on a multi-product firm’s incentive to be aggressive to single-product
rivals is ambiguous and depends on the fine details of the model of consumer demand.
Without very detailed data on consumer preferences, it is hard for an anti-trust authority
to predict a priori whether bundling will relax or intensify competition.
Another way in which price discriminationmight relax competition is when price-matching
contracts are used, i.e., when a firm promises consumers it will match a lower price of a ri-
val firm if consumers can find evidence of such a price. Such contracts are a form of price
discrimination since the price a consumer pays diﬀers according to their knowledge of other
firms’ prices and their willingness to go to the trouble to provide evidence of a lower price.
If consumers are well informed about all rivals’ prices and there are no eﬀort costs involved
in documenting the lower prices, there is a clear danger of collusion: there is no incentive
for one firm to undercut another since the low-priced firm will not obtain greater market
share and will simply lower its and its rivals’ prices. In this stark framework, public policy
which prohibits the use of such “competitor-based” discrimination schemes would help re-
store normal competitive pressure in the market, to the benefit of consumers. However, if
consumers face costs of searching for price oﬀers or providing evidence of low prices, a more
conventional price discrimination motive emerges: sorting consumers on the basis of their
value of time (akin to the use of discount coupons). In such cases, the collusive impact of
competitor-based discrimination is blunted, and consumers might sometimes be better oﬀ
with this form of price discrimination is employed.30
A further way in which price discrimination might act to limit competition occurs when
it leads to negative network eﬀects. Consider an telecommunications market in which sub-
scribers join one network or another. Public policy might or might not permit firms to price
discriminate on the basis of the destination network. This form of discrimination is present
if a subscriber on network A faces a diﬀerent call charge if his call is made to another sub-
scriber on network A or to a subscriber on a rival network B. If firms each make it cheaper
to make calls to people on rival networks than to people on their own network, then negative
network eﬀects are present and, all else equal, a subscriber prefers to join a smaller network
since they can then make a greater fraction of their calls at the cheap rate. It is well known
that markets with negative network eﬀects of this form will not be very competitive, since a
firm which oﬀers a low price will not attract many new subscribers. Therefore, this form of
price discrimination can act to relax competition, to the detriment of consumers.31
30See Corts (1996), for example.
31I have skated over the means with which firms agree to set lower prices to make calls to subscribers on
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9 Eﬀects of discrimination on entry
The eﬀects of price discrimination on entry is a central concern of competition policy. Three
broad issues are discussed: (i) the eﬀect on the equilibrium number of firms in a monopo-
listic competition framework; (ii) the eﬀect on a monopolist’s incentive to enter an adjacent
market; and (iii) the eﬀect on a potential entrant’s incentive to enter a monopolized market.
9.1 Free entry
Price discrimination can raise or lower equilibrium profits in a market with a given number
of firms, as seen in the previous sections. When there is free entry of firms, it follows that
the equilibrium number of firms will rise with price discrimination in the former case, but
will fall in the latter case when more intense competition will drive out some firms. In some
common models of oligopolistic interaction–though by no means all–it is well known that
free entry will result in too many firms entering from a total welfare perspective.32 In those
cases where price discrimination raises profits, the resulting greater entry will only exacerbate
the welfare costs of excessive entry. By contrast, when price discrimination destroys profits,
the excess entry problem will be mitigated (although typically not overturned).33
9.2 A monopolist’s incentive to enter an adjacent market
The second topic in this section involves a monopolist in one market entering an “adjacent”
market. The motives considered here are not necessarily anti-competitive–there need not
be a motive to drive firms out of the adjacent market–but rather the firm wishes to engage
in price discrimination, and in some situations the only way it can do this is by participating
in the adjacent market.
Ability to oﬀer quantity discounts: In this example, product 1 is monopolized by firm A,
while product 2 is potentially supplied in a competitive market with price equal to cost. For
simplicity, suppose all production is costless. Suppose product 2 is a complementary product
rival networks. In the telecommunications context, this could be done via low “call termination” rates. If
firms agree to set their charge for delivering calls from rival networks below the associated cost, then firms
will have an incentive to set low charges for calls made to rival networks. See Laﬀont, Rey, and Tirole (1998),
Gans and King (2001) and Berger (2005) for further details.
32See Mankiw and Whinston (1986), for instance.
33See Borenstein (1985), Norman and Thisse (1996) and Bhaskar and To (2004) for further analysis of the
eﬀect of price discrimination on the free-entry number of firms. Ordover and Panzar (1982) investigate the
eﬀects of an upstream monopolist’s use of two-part pricing on the number of downstream firms. They find
that in general the monopolist will not set a socially optimal two-part tariﬀ, despite the fact that it knows
everything about its downstream customers. Thus, in this respect there is a contrast between selling to final
consumers (when the use of two-part tariﬀs leads to an eﬃcient outcome, as discussed in section 2 above)
and selling to intermediate customers.
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to product 1, but consumed in variable quantities by consumers. Consumers wish to buy
just one unit of product 1, however. (The classical examples of this situation are computers
and punch-cards, or photocopiers and toner.) Consumers diﬀer in how much of the joint
product they wish to consume. Suppose demand for the joint product by a consumer with
demand parameter θ is θ−p2 if the marginal price for product 2 is p2. Suppose θ is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1. If p1 is the price for product 1, a consumer’s net surplus is
1
2
(θ − p2)2 − p1. Therefore, a consumer will participate in the market if θ ≥
√
2p1 + p2, and
total demand for product 1 and product 2 is respectively
q1 = 1−
³p
2p1 + p2
´
; q2 = 12(1− p2)
2 − p1 .
If the monopolist for product 1 ties the purchase of its monopoly product to purchase
of the potentially competitive product 2, it can set a price above cost for product 2. It
will then choose the pair of prices (p1, p2) to maximize total profit p1q1 + p2q2, and this
entails p1 = 0.08 and p2 = 0.2. This brings in profit of 0.08, while consumer surplus is
approximately 0.043. In particular, the monopolist wants to set a price above cost for
product 2.34 If the monopolist did not tie product 2 with product 1, all active consumers
will buy product 2 on the competitive market with price p2 = 0. This will surely bring
the monopolist less profit than the tying strategy (since it could choose p2 = 0 under the
tying regime, but preferred to set p2 = 0.2). Therefore, the monopolist has an incentive
to “leverage” its monopoly position for product 1 into the market for product 2. If such
tying is not permitted (so p2 = 0), the monopolist would significantly increase its product 1
price to p1 = 0.22. Its profit is then 0.074, while consumer surplus is essentially unchanged
at 0.044. In this example, then, total welfare is higher if the monopolist is permitted to
tie its product, although in general the comparison is ambiguous.35 ,36 Notice also that the
monopolist would like to pursue this tying strategy even it incurred a slightly higher cost
in supplying product 2 than did the competitive rivals. (This assumes that the monopolist
34The monopolist will do even better if its sets a fully nonlinear tariﬀ, rather than just a two-part tariﬀ,
for consumption of the joint product.
35See section 3.3.1.5 in Tirole (1988) for a clear account.
36In fact, the firm can also do well if it oﬀers consumers an optional bundled tariﬀ. Suppose that the
firm oﬀers consumers the profit-maximizing unbundled tariﬀ (p1 = 0.22, p2 = 0). Suppose, in addition to
this tariﬀ, the firm oﬀers consumers the option of another tariﬀ which has a lower price for the monopoly
component but a higher price for the competitive good. Such a tariﬀ will be attractive to consumers with
relatively low demands. Specifically, if the firm oﬀers the optional tariﬀ with pˆ1 = 0.037 and pˆ2 = 0.272 then
those consumers with 0.54 ≤ θ ≤ 0.82 will use this new tariﬀ. (Some of these are new consumers and some
are “cannibalized” from the existing tariﬀ.) Since consumers have the option of using the unbundled tariﬀ,
consumer surplus surely rises with the addition of this tariﬀ. Also, the firm’s profit with the new optional
tariﬀ is 0.081, which is higher than that generated by the unbundled tariﬀ on its own, and also higher than
that generated by the optimal single two-part tariﬀ (p1 = 0.08, p2 = 0.2). Therefore, the introduction of
this optional tariﬀ represents a Pareto improvement compared to when the unbundled tariﬀ is used on its
own. See Nalebuﬀ (2005) for related analysis (where the same model for consumer demand is employed).
21
cannot monitor a consumer’s consumption of product 2 from rival suppliers.) In this sense,
the monopolist has an incentive to exclude more eﬃcient rivals.
Ability to oﬀer bundling discounts: Since a multi-product monopolist typically gains when
it can bundle its products–see the discussion in section 6 above–it follows that a multi-
product monopolist makes greater total profit than if the same products were supplied by a
series of single-product monopolies. (If the products were supplied by single-product firms,
then prices would be product-by-product.) This is true even when the various products are
neither complements or substitutes in the usual sense. In technical terms, there may be
“informational economies of scope” involved in multi-product supply, even if more familiar
economies of scope are not present.37
To illustrate, return to the example in section 6 where there are two products, 1 and 2, and
consumers have valuations (v1, v2) for these two products individually and valuation v1 + v2
for joint consumption. If production is costless and the valuations are uniformly distributed
on [0, 1]2, the multi-product monopolist obtains profit of 0.55 by practising mixed bundling,
while a pair of single-product monopolies each supplying one product make a combined profit
of 0.5. To see how this aﬀects a monopolist’s incentive to enter an adjacent market, consider
the following broadcasting scenario. There is an incumbent broadcaster who currently holds
broadcasting rights to a particular sports event. The rights to a second, perhaps unrelated,
sports event then become available for auction. Because the incumbent broadcaster will be
able to engage in bundling if it obtains the second rights, but a new broadcaster will not,
the incumbent will be willing to pay more for the new rights than a new broadcaster. (It
will be prepared to pay up to 0.3 for the new rights, whereas a new broadcaster could only
pay 0.25.)
Thus, even if for no other reason, this argument suggests that an existing rights holder is
likely to win a bidding war for any new rights. Indeed, in a richer model where the entrant
might oﬀer a superior service (e.g., it has lower supply costs or a higher quality service),
the incumbent might be prepared to pay more for the additional rights than the superior
entrant. However, set against this is the fact that consumers often benefit from bundling.
For instance, in this particular example, consumers are better oﬀ if the incumbent wins the
new rights and practices bundling. Thus, if policy-makers are deciding whether to permit
bundling, they may have to trade-oﬀ the possible consumer benefits of bundling against
the possible foreclosure of more eﬃcient entrants. The information required to implement
accurate policy in this environment is formidable.
This provides a simple example of “conglomeration” eﬀects (or “portfolio” or “range”
eﬀects), which have risen in prominence in anti-trust cases in recent years. See Neven
(2007) for a more detailed account of such cases, which include the controversial General
37See Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) for further analysis of this issue. Of course, the argument does not
apply to third-degree price discrimination, where there are several separate markets and each consumer
wishes to purchase just a single product from the multi-market firm.
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Electric/Honeywell merger. One reason why these cases are challenging for the competition
authorities is that the standard approaches to market definition no longer always apply
well.38
9.3 An entrant’s incentive to enter a monopolized market
One of the most controversial aspects of price discrimination is the possible impact of an
incumbent’s ability to price discriminate on the incentives for entry. There are a number of
ways in which price discrimination by an incumbent firm aﬀects the incentives to enter its
markets. Constraining the incumbent’s freedom to choose its prices aﬀects its response to
entry, and hence the expected post-entry profits of the entrant.
This is illustrated in the context of the model of third-degree price discrimination based
on Armstrong and Vickers (1993) discussed in section 7. There is a multi-market incumbent
facing potential entry into one of its markets. If the incumbent is permitted to set diﬀerent
prices in its two markets, then it is plausible that it will react more aggressively to entry
compared to when it must set the same price in the competitive and the captive market. We
conclude that the post-entry profit of the entrant is likely to be lower when the incumbent
can price discriminate than when it cannot. If the entrant has a fixed cost of entry, it will
enter only if it expects post-entry profit to cover its entry cost. There are then three cases to
consider. If the entry cost is large, there will be no entry regardless of whether the incumbent
can price discriminate. In this case, the social desirability of price discrimination is exactly
as in the standard monopoly case, and this is ambiguous in general. Similarly, if the entry
cost is very small, entry will take place regardless of policy towards price discrimination.
The interesting case is when the cost of entry lies in the intermediate range where entry is
profitable only if the incumbent cannot price discriminate, so that a ban on price discrimi-
nation acts to induce entry. In such cases it is plausible that a ban on price discrimination
will cause the prices in both markets to fall: if discrimination is possible, there will be no
entry and the incumbent will charge monopoly prices in each market; if the incumbent must
charge a common price in the two markets, this will bring in the entrant and force both of
the incumbent’s prices down from monopoly levels.
The general principle, as in the Thisse-Vives quote in section 7 above, is that denying
an incumbent the right to meet the price of a competitor on a discriminatory basis provides
the latter with some protection against price attacks. While the eﬀect of a ban on price
discrimination is indeed to weaken competition if the entrant is already in the market, once
the ex ante incentives to enter are considered, the eﬀect of a ban on price discrimination might
actually be pro-competitive. However, the welfare eﬀects of a ban on price discrimination
38Another way in which price discrimination interacts with market definition is that, (i) when a hypothet-
ical monopolist is able to price discriminate between two or more consumer groups, these consumer groups
will make up separate anti-trust markets, while (ii) when the monopolist cannot price discriminate, the
whole market becomes the relevant market for anti-trust purposes. For instance, see the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines issued by the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 1992.
23
in this context are not clear cut. For instance, since the incumbent is reluctant to cut its
profits in the captive market by meeting its rival’s price in the competitive market, even a
highly ineﬃcient entrant might prosper. While preventing an incumbent from engaging in
selective price cuts is likely to be a powerful means with which to assist entry, as with many
forms of indirect entry assistance the danger of ineﬃcient entry is never far away.
This question of whether to permit (above cost) selective price cuts is of substantial
importance in practice. For instance, many network industry incumbents (such as privatized
telecom companies) are required to oﬀer geographically uniform retail tariﬀs, even though
they face competition only in particular areas (such as cities). While such a policy will indeed
act to encourage entry and to “bring the benefits of competition to the whole country” (as it
is often put), it is also likely to induce ineﬃcient, or excessive, entry into the attractive market
segments. The question is also important in markets without a history of regulation. For
instance, Vickers (2005, page F249) summarizes a recent anti-trust case involving shipping:
“Above-cost price cuts were at issue in the case of Compagnie Maritime Belge,
on which the ECJ gave judgment in 2000. The enterprise, which had a near-
monopoly position on certain shipping routes between Europe and West Africa,
had selectively cut prices to match those of its competitor, though not demon-
strably to below total average cost. The Court saw the risk that condemning
such pricing could give ineﬃcient rivals a safe haven from the full rigours of
competition, but in the circumstances at hand judged that there was abuse (al-
beit not abuse under the heading of predation) because the selective price cuts
were aimed at eliminating competition while allowing continuing higher prices
for uncontested services.”
The situation in which a firm selectively lowers its prices in more competitive markets is
closely connected to the situation in which a firm selectively oﬀers low prices to customers of
a rival. We will discuss this issue in more detail in section 10, albeit mostly in the context of
competition between symmetric firms. When firms are symmetric, we will see that selective
price cuts to a rival’s past customers can reduce prices to all consumers.
A second way in which price discriminationmight impede entry concerns (pure) bundling.39
In section 7 we presented Whinston (1990)’s model where, if a multi-product firm bundles
its two products, the equilibrium profits of the single-product rival are reduced. Therefore,
if the multi-product incumbent can commit to bundle its products together before the entry
decision has been made, this can act to deter entry. (Again, this will depend on the size
of the fixed cost of entry.) Once entry is deterred, the incumbent can raise its bundle price
to the monopoly level. There are a broad range of situations in which the incumbent finds
39The most prominent case relevant to this is the Microsoft case, and in particular the part of the case
relating to the bundling of the Internet Explorer browser with its Windows operating system–see section
7.5 of Motta (2004) for some further details. An earlier relevant case from 1979 is Berkey Photo v. Eastman
Kodak.
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it privately profitable to deter entry in this way, but where total welfare would be higher
if entry took place. Such instances provide a coherent case for a ban on bundling by an
incumbent.
From the incumbent’s point of view, one problem with the strategy is that, if entry does
take place, the incumbent also makes lower profits with bundling than with unbundled prices.
That is to say, its plan to bundle products might not be credible. The entrant might predict
that the incumbent will renege on its promise to bundle if entry does take place, in which
case the threat to bundle carries little weight. However, there are plenty of cases where the
bundling decision is a long-term decision (if it is built into the product design, for instance),
in which case it has credibility and the ability to deter entry.40
Another problem is that apparently minor changes to the model imply that bundling,
even if credible, will not deter entry. For instance, in section 8 we saw that if consumers had
heterogeneous valuations for the monopolized product, it might be that both firms’ profits
are higher if the multi-product firm bundles its products. In this case, bundling acts to
encourage entry. Since the incumbent would still like to deter entry so it can set monopoly
prices in both of its markets, if there is a fixed cost of entry the incumbent might well
prefer to commit to unbundled pricing to deter entry (even though if entry did occur, the
incumbent would prefer to revert to the bundling strategy which boosts both firms’ profits).
While a monopolist would prefer to bundle its products in this example, unbundled pricing
with monopoly yields higher profit (0.5) than does bundling with entry in one market (which
yields the incumbent profit of only 0.367).
This discussion of bundling so far has assumed the two products enter additively into
consumer utility: the fact that a consumer has purchased product 1 has no impact on her
willingness-to-pay for product 2. Many examples of bundling involve complements. In the
extreme case of perfect complements, a consumer places no value on product 2 unless she
also has product 1. The analysis changes somewhat when the two products are perfect
complements. For one thing, a firm with a monopoly on one component clearly has the
ability to foreclose entry into the complementary product market, simply by bundling its
two components together. Whether it has the incentive to do this is another question.
Whinston (1990, section III) shows in a benchmark model that the incumbent has no such
incentive. Indeed, the incumbent generally benefits from the presence of a diﬀerentiated
entrant in one component market. For instance, if the entrant provides an identical product
2 component but at lower cost, the incumbent will be able to extract all the entrant’s profit
by setting a product 2 price below its own cost, and raising its product 1 price accordingly.
This is an instance of the Chicago School’s insight that an incumbent has no incentive to
prevent entry by a more eﬃcient firm in a complementary product market.41 Similarly, if the
40Nalebuﬀ (2004) mainly considers a model in which the incumbent firm not only makes its bundling
decision prior to entry, but decides on its prices before entry. Among other results, he shows that bundling is
an eﬀective way to deter single-product entry if the incumbent does not know in advance into which market
the entrant will enter.
41The Chicago argument relies on the integrated firm possessing accurate information about its rivals’
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entrant oﬀers a diﬀerentiated product 2 component which appeals more to some consumers
than the incumbent’s own product, the incumbent will make more profit by allowing the
entrant to deliver its monopoly component to the entrant’s own pool of consumers.42
Still in the context of perfect complements, Choi and Stefanadis (2001) examine the
case where an entrant must innovate if it is to produce a successful substitute for one of
the incumbent’s components. If the incumbent bundles its two product, this implies that
there is no scope for single component entry. Entry then requires successful innovation on
both fronts. Bundling can therefore reduce the incentive to innovate and so can increase the
probability that the incumbent retains its markets. However, it is not always optimal for
the incumbent to bundle, since it benefits when an entrant successfully innovates on just one
component (as in the previous paragraph). Carlton and Waldman (2002) present a model
where entry into the monopolized market is more likely to occur if the entrant is first active in
the competitive market. If the entrant oﬀers a superior product in the competitive market, or
if its costs are lower there, then entry there is socially desirable. If entry were to be limited
to that market, the incumbent would also welcome entry (as in the previous paragraph).
However, the incumbent might choose to bundle its products and prevent desirable entry
into the competitive market in order to discourage subsequent entry into its captive market.
10 Dynamic price discrimination
A topic which has received much recent attention is dynamic price discrimination. A pub-
lisher sets a high price for a new (hardback) book, then subsequently the price is reduced. Or
a retailer might use information it has obtained from its previous dealings with a customer
to oﬀer that customer a special deal (or, as we will see, sometimes a bad deal). As discussed
in the introduction, it is plausible that these forms of price discrimination have proliferated
in recent years, due to developments in information technology. The cases of monopoly and
duopoly supply are discussed in turn.
10.1 Monopoly
Classical results demonstrate that (i) if a monopolist can commit to its future prices it
often does not wish to engage in inter-temporal price discrimination,43 and (ii) if the firm
cannot commit to its future prices it will decrease its price over time, its total profit is lower
capabilities. Section 11 below discusses a model where the integrated firm is unsure about a rival’s cost of
supply, and here the firm does have an incentive to exclude a more eﬃcient rival.
42Whinston shows that if the complementary products are not perfect complements, then the incumbent
may again wish to exclude a rival by means of bundling.
43See Stokey (1979). If the model is modified so that either consumers have diﬀerent discount factors or
consumers as a whole have a diﬀerent discount factor to the firm, then it can be optimal to commit to a
decreasing time path.
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than in (i) while consumers are better oﬀ compared to (i).44 Therefore, a ban on price
discrimination in this context, even if feasible, will act to boost the monopolist’s profits and
harm consumers, since it gives the firm commitment power.
In more detail, suppose the firm can sell its product over two periods. There are two
classes of model that are relevant. First, there is the “single sale” (or durable good) model
where a consumer wishes to buy just a single unit of the good over the time horizon. (An
example of this might be a new novel.) Second, there is the “repeated sale” model, where
a consumer potentially wishes to consume in both periods. (An example of this might be a
supermarket or online retailer.)
Consider first the single sale model. Suppose that there is a diverse population of con-
sumers, each of whom wishes to buy just a single unit of a monopolist’s good. As in section 3,
consumer’s valuation for this item, v, varies among consumers according to the distribution
function F (v).
First suppose that consumers are myopic, and they will buy the good as soon as the
price oﬀered is lower than their valuation, v. In this case the firm can fully extract consumer
surplus by oﬀering a price which decreases over time. By moving down the demand curve in
this way, first-degree price discrimination is achieved. Notice that there is no issue about the
firm committing to a price path over time in this special case when consumers are myopic.
If consumers are forward looking, however, the firm will not be able to extract consumer
surplus fully, even if it can commit to future prices. Moreover, the firm will lose profit if
it cannot commit to a time path for prices. Initially, suppose the firm can commit to a
price pair {p1, p2}, where pt is its price in period t = 1, 2. For simplicity, suppose that v is
uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and production is costless. It is then straightforward to show
that the profit-maximizing price pair is p1 = p2 = 12 . Therefore, there is no inter-temporal
discrimination, and consumers buy either in the first period or not at all. This analysis
changes if consumers are forward looking and the firm is able to “change its mind” in the
second period. Once consumers with v ≥ 1
2
have purchased in the first period, the firm is
left with a pool of less enthusiastic consumers. Given this, in the second period the profit-
maximizing policy is to set p2 = 14 . Of course, if consumers foresee that the firm will behave
in this opportunistic manner, their first period choice will be aﬀected, and some consumers
will strategically delay their purchase in order to receive the discounted price next period.
To counteract this eﬀect, the firm will optimally set an initial price p1 < 12 . In sum, when the
firm has the freedom to set its second-period price only after the initial period, both prices
decrease compared to the case where the firm can commit (when p1 = p2 = 12). If, somehow,
public policy prohibited inter-termporal price discrimination so that the firm was forced to
set p2 = p1, this would restore the firm’s ability to commit to future prices, and would boost
profit and harm consumers.
Next, consider the repeated sale model, and suppose that an individual consumer has
the same valuation v for a unit in each of the two periods. Now, the firm has potentially
44This point was first made by Coase (1972). See also Hart and Tirole (1988).
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three prices to choose: p1, the price for a unit in the first period; p2, the price in the second
period if the consumer did not purchase in the first period; and pˆ2, the price for a unit in the
second period if the consumer also purchased in the first period. When the firm can commit
to its second-period prices, one can show that the profit-maximizing pricing policy is just
to set p1 = p2 = pˆ2 = 12 . Therefore, it is optimal not to price discriminate. When the firm
cannot commit, one can show that the most profitable prices satisfy45
p2 ≤ p1 ≤
1
2
≤ pˆ2 .
Therefore, when the firm cannot commit to its future prices, it will set a relatively low first-
period price (p1 ≤ 12), and then a high second-period price for those (high-value) consumers
who purchased in the first period (pˆ2 ≥ 12) and an even lower second-period price aimed at
those who did not purchase in the first period (p2 ≤ p1).46 In particular, the firm views its
past customers as its strong market in the second period, and new customers as its weak
market. (This ranking also holds in oligopoly settings below.) All consumers are better oﬀ
when the firm cannot commit, while the firm is obviously worse oﬀ. Total welfare is also
higher without commitment. Again, the eﬀect of a ban on price discrimination is to give the
firm commitment power, to the detriment of consumers.47
10.2 Oligopoly
In this section I mention two models, both of which are repeated sale models involving
symmetric firms. Each model involves a firm learning about a consumer’s brand preferences
from her initial choice of firm. In one model, due to Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), consumers
have a stable brand preference for one of the two firms. If a consumer buys from firm A
in the first period, she will most likely prefer to buy from firm A in the second period as
well, all else equal, and both firms will price accordingly. In the second model, due to Chen
45See section 2.2 of Armstrong (2006) for further details.
46Of course, this form of discrimination is not feasible if past consumers can pretend to be new customers,
for instance by deleting their computer “cookies” or using another credit card when they deal with an online
retailer.
47Taylor (2004) analyzes a related situation where one firm sells a product in period 1 and a separate
firm sells a related product in period 2. The first firm is able to sell its information about which consumers
purchased from it in the first period to the second firm. The second firm is willing to pay for this information,
since it provides the basis for behaviour-based price discrimination towards its consumers. Since the first
firm can fully extract the second firm’s benefit from the information, the scenario is essentially the same
as when an integrated firm supplies in both periods and cannot commit to its second-period price. Taylor
distinguishes between sophisticated and naive consumers. If consumers are naive, in the sense that they do
not foresee their decisions with one firm might aﬀect their oﬀers from the subsequent firm, the first firm
has an incentive to raise its price above the monopoly level in order to boost the value of information to
the second firm. Public policy towards privacy might prohibit the passing of consumer information between
firms, and this would make naive consumers better oﬀ and reduce the level of industry profit. On the other
hand, when consumers are sophisticated, a ban on information transfer will surely increase industry profit.
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(1997b), consumers initially view the two firms as perfect substitutes, but in the second
period they incur a switching cost if they change supplier, and firms price accordingly in the
second period.48
In each model, firms set their second-period prices taking as given their first-period
market shares, i.e., the framework is one where firms oﬀer short-term contracts and there
is no commitment to future prices. In both models, the second period resembles the static
model of Thisse and Vives (1988) discussed in section 7: whenever such price discrimination
is permitted, firms will price low to try to “poach” their rival’s previous customers and
price high to their own previous customers. Each firm regards its own previous customers
as its strong market, and there is “best-response asymmetry” in the terminology of Corts
(1998). Therefore, the models share the feature that second-period prices are all lower than
they would be if behaviour-based discrimination were not feasible.49 Moreover, both models
predict there to be excessive switching in the second period, in the sense that some consumers
will buy from their less preferred firm because they are tempted by the low poaching price.
Therefore, in these simple models with unit demand, behaviour-based price discrimination
causes welfare to fall.50
While the two models are similar in terms of their predicted prices in the second period,
they diﬀer significantly in their prediction for how initial prices are determined. In broad
terms, when behaviour-based price discrimination is employed, the Fudenberg-Tirole model
predicts that prices are initially high and then decline, while Chen’s model suggests that
prices are initially low and then rise. (This latter result is common to most switching cost
models.) Fudenberg and Tirole show in a specific example that when firms practice price
discrimination, profit (over the two periods) falls and consumers in aggregate are better oﬀ.
In Chen’s model firms are always better oﬀ when price discrimination is not possible, and
it is ambiguous whether consumers are better or worse oﬀ. (As already mentioned, in both
models total welfare falls when price discrimination is employed.)
The discussion so far has not considered the possibility within the Fudenberg-Tirole
framework that consumer brand preferences might change over time. For simplicity, consider
the opposite polar case, and suppose that second-period brand preferences are independent
of those in the first period. In this case, the consumer’s choice of firm in the first period gives
no useful information to firms in the second period, and there is no motive for a firm to set
discriminatory prices to its own past customers and its rival’s past customers. Suppose now
48See Taylor (2003) for an extension to Chen’s analysis in a number of important directions, for instance
to more than two periods and more than two firms. When there are more than two periods, the fact that a
consumer switched supplier in the second period indicates that the consumer has low switching costs, and
this could generate more intense competition for him in future periods.
49Thus, even if it appears to be “unfair” to the firm’s existing customers that the firm’s new customers
often obtain a better deal, it is quite possible that if this form of price discrimination were forbidden, the
existing customers would be yet worse oﬀ.
50However, in a richer model where consumers had elastic, multi-unit demands each period, the low
second-period prices would bring welfare benefits which might outweigh the welfare losses due to excessive
switching.
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that firms can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy, i.e., they can credibly announce the
three prices–the initial price, the second-period price if the consumer did not buy in the first
period, and the second-period price if the consumer did buy from the firm in the first period–
at the start of period 1. (This setting, where firms commit to explicit loyalty schemes, seems
broadly applicable to frequent flier programmes and the like.) In this case, the static model of
competitive mixed bundling by Matutes and Regibeau (1992), discussed in section 7 above,
can be applied. As such, the dynamic loyalty scheme causes all prices to fall compared to the
case when firms did not make their second-period prices depend on whether the consumer
purchased from them in the first period. This is clearly good for consumers, although social
welfare is reduced since there is excessive loyalty. This provides an interesting contrast to the
Fudenberg-Tirole model without commitment, where the ineﬃciency was due to insuﬃcient
loyalty to firms. It is important to recognize, though, that both forms of dynamic price
discrimination–ex post discrimination to poach rival consumers and ex ante explicit loyalty
schemes–are often pro-consumer in their impact.
The discussion so far has assumed the two firms are symmetric and that there is no pos-
sible exit of firms. By contrast, anti-trust scrutiny of price discrimination typically focusses
on the case where one firm is dominant. There has so far been little work done on dynamic
price discrimination when firms are asymmetric. Chen (2006) takes a first step, and shows
that the use of behaviour-based price discrimination might induce a weak firm to leave the
market. For instance, he shows that the stronger firm may price below cost when selling to
the rival’s past consumers, with the aim and eﬀect of eliminating socially desirable compe-
tition. The use of this form of price discrimination to deter entry and induce exit deserves
further scrutiny.
11 Price Discrimination in Vertically Related Markets
In practice, many of the most pressing antitrust concerns about price discrimination relate
to the pricing of inputs. For instance, Article 82(c) of the EC Treaty states explicitly that
a dominant firm is abusive if it applies “dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.” We divide
the discussion into two parts to cover cases where the upstream monopolist is vertically
integrated or vertically separated.
Consider first a vertically-integrated firm which supplies an essential input to a potential
entrant. Suppose that the incumbent firm has marginal cost c1 for supplying its service to
final consumers and marginal cost c2 for supplying the input to a potential entrant. The
entrant needs one unit of the input for each unit of output it supplies, and it incurs marginal
cost c for converting a unit of the input into a unit of the final product. (No firm incurs any
fixed costs in this simple framework.) Suppose consumers view the final products of the two
firms as perfect substitutes, and choose to buy from the lower priced firm. Suppose that the
incumbent does not know the marginal cost c of the entrant at the time it sets its two prices
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p and a, where p is the incumbent’s price to final consumers and a is its (access) price for the
input. Suppose the cost c is perceived to be a random variable with distribution function
F (c). If the incumbent sets the two prices p and a, the entrant can profitably enter if its own
costs are lower than the maximum price it can charge, i.e., when a + c < p, in which case
the incumbent will make its profit solely from selling the input to the entrant. Otherwise,
the incumbent makes its profit solely from selling directly to final consumers. Therefore, the
incumbent’s expected profit is
π = F (p− a)q(p)(a− c2) + [1− F (p− a)] q(p)(p− c1) .
If we write m = p− a for the margin oﬀered to the entrant, this profit can be written as
π = q(p)(p− c1) + q(p)F (m)(c1 − c2 −m) .
Therefore, regardless of the incumbent’s decision about its retail price p, if free to do so it
will choose m to maximize F (m)(c1 − c2 −m). In general, this entails m < c1 − c2, or
a > c2 + [p− c1] . (1)
What does price discrimination (as broadly interpreted) mean in this context? Intuitively,
as with Article 82(c), the integrated firm discriminates against the entrant when the entrant
faces a diﬀerent (higher) cost for its input than does the “downstream” part of the integrated
firm. But what is the true economic cost to the integrated firm in supplying a unit of the
input to the entrant? One naive answer is that it is the physical cost c2. But this ignores
the opportunity cost element, that when the integrated firm supplies a unit of input to the
entrant it supplies one less unit to final consumers and foregoes a profit there of p−c1. That
is to say, the economic cost to the monopolist of supplying a unit of the input to the rival is
c2 + [p− c1], and so the non-discriminatory input price is
a = c2 + [p− c1] . (2)
With this input price the potential entrant finds it profitable to enter only if this is the more
eﬃcient way to supply the product to final consumers. (With expression (2) the entrant
will enter only if c + c2 < c1, i.e., when this is the lower cost method of delivering the
product to consumers.) That is to say, if the input price is set as in expression (2) then
an equally eﬃcient entrant can just survive in the market. If the input charge satisfies (1),
however, an equally eﬃcient entrant cannot survive in the market.51 The reason why an
integrated firm wishes sometimes to exclude a more eﬃcient rival in this case (in contrast to
51In anti-trust terminology, a vertically-integrated incumbent is sometimes said to practice a “price
squeeze” (or “margin squeeze”) if an equally eﬃcient entrant makes a loss with the oﬀered margin–see
Vickers (2005, section 2.3) for further discussion and a summary of recent price squeeze cases. Grout (2001)
and Bouckaert and Verboven (2004) discuss the implementation of price squeeze rules in richer settings than
discussed here (such as when the entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry or when the incumbent incurs extra
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the standard Chicago result) is that the entrant has private information about its cost, and
the incumbent wishes to appropriate part of the entrant’s eﬃciency advantage.52 Therefore,
an unconstrained integrated firm might be expected to show undue discrimination against
a rival. In such circumstances, a ban on this kind of price discrimination will raise total
welfare compared to a laissez-faire regime.53
Consider next an alternative scenario in which a vertically-separated upstreammonopolist
sells an essential input, again with cost c2, to two competing downstream firms, A and B
say. For simplicity, suppose that A and B compete in a Cournot fashion, given the input
prices set by the upstream firm.54 Suppose that the contract between the monopolist and a
downstream firm i takes the form of a two-part tariﬀ, with fixed charge f i and per unit of
input price ai. First, note that by an appropriate choice of two-part tariﬀ, the monopolist
can ensure (i) the industry profit is maximized and (ii) it appropriates the entire industry
profit. (This is done by setting a high per-unit input price a–above the cost c2–which
generates high retail prices downstream, and then extracting the downstream profit via the
fixed charge f .) In many relevant cases, however, the fact that buyers are firms rather than
consumers implies that these contracts for input prices will be negotiated bilaterally rather
than simply announced by the monopolist. Indeed, it is plausible that each downstream
firm’s contract with the monopolist will not be observed by the rival downstream firm. In
this situation of secret deals the monopolist finds it hard to avoid oﬀering each downstream
firm a cost-based two-part tariﬀ, with ai = c2. Of course, if both A and B pay for the input
at cost, then the industry outcome will correspond to the (moderately) competitive Cournot
outcome rather than the industry profit-maximizing outcome. In eﬀect, the monopolist
cannot avoid “competing with itself”.
Why is the monopolist forced to set ai = c2 in this framework? Since it is secret, the
choice of contract between the monopolist and firm A, say, cannot aﬀect the expected output
from firm B (or its input choice). Therefore, the contract with A will maximize the combined
costs when it supplies the input to the rival than it does when it supplies itself). Although price squeezes
share with predatory price the feature that a “price” (here, the margin) is below avoided cost (here, the
opportunity cost), there is nothing necessarily predatory about them. For instance, in the example presented
in the text, the integrated monopolist set a low margin not to drive out rivals with a view to subsequently
raising a price, but to extract some of the potentially eﬃciency gains generated by entrant supply. (Indeed
the monopolist is here better oﬀ when entry occurs.)
52If the monopolist did know the entrant’s cost c, and was permitted to base its input charge on this cost
(another form of price discrimination), it would set the input price which just ensured profitable entry by an
equally or more eﬃcient entrant. The result is productive eﬃciency, but the entrant is left with zero profit.
This outcome corresponds closely with the case of first-degree price discrimination discussed in section 3.
53However, Armstrong and Vickers (1998) argue that from a social welfare perspective it is often better
to require the incumbent to set its input price equal to its cost c2 than to require it to satisfy condition (2),
for the reason that this condition (2) provides no constraint on the incumbent’s retail price p.
54The key papers relevant to this “secret deals” problem are Hart and Tirole (1990), O’Brien and Shaﬀer
(1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994). See Rey and Tirole (2006) for a full account of this literature. In
particular, the results reported in the text are also valid when the downstream firms compete in prices. I
have largely taken this informal discussion from Vickers (1996).
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profits of A and the monopolist, taking the contract with B as given. But the joint profit-
maximizing contract will involve aA = c2, since in that way the downstream firm’s incentives
are in line with the monopolist’s. A similar contract will be secretly agreed with firm B.
The monopolist’s market power is eroded by its inability not to negotiate eﬃcient bilateral
deals secretly with the downstream firms.
This eﬀect is closely related to the Coasian problem for the inter-temporal monopolist
which was discussed in section 10.1 above. In the dynamic context, the unconstrained
monopolist cannot commit not to oﬀer a good deal to the remaining (low value) consumers
in the second period, and this acts to undermine its market power. And just as with the
Coase problem, a policy to ban price discrimination in input prices will act to restore the
monopolist’s market power. If the upstream monopolist were not allowed to oﬀer diﬀerent
terms to diﬀerent downstream firms, then it cannot secretly negotiate eﬃcient bilateral
contracts, and it can implement the monopoly outcome. As in the Coase problem, then, a
policy which bans price discrimination may end up being detrimental to (final) consumers.
12 Conclusion
The welfare eﬀects of allowing price discrimination are ambiguous, both with monopoly and
with oligopoly supply. There is of course no justification for public policies that prohibit
price discrimination in general. Price discrimination can lead to eﬃcient pricing, for instance
(see section 3). Price discrimination can lead to more intense competition which benefits
consumers (see sections 7 and 10). When firms have diﬃculty committing to prices, they
often are forced to charge low prices. In such situations, a policy which forbids discrimination
endows a firm with commitment power and prevents the firm competing with itself, to
the detriment of consumers and welfare (sections 10.1 and 11). When firms oﬀer diﬀerent
prices to their loyal customers and to their new customers this can make competition more
intense, but it can also induce excessive switching between firms (section 10.2). By contrast,
multiproduct firms might induce excessive loyalty by means of bundling discounts (section
7). Price discrimination can also lead firms to leave consumers with less surplus than they
would enjoy in its absence (sections 3 and 8). In addition, the freedom of an incumbent firm
to engage in price discrimination will typically have a discouraging eﬀect on entry (sections
9.3 and 11).
Ideally, then, policy towards price discrimination should be founded on good economic
understanding of the market in question. This survey has highlighted the formidable amount
of information required to determine when price discrimination is likely to be welfare enhanc-
ing or decreasing. Since it is impractical, and undesirable, to require competition bodies to
have a good economic understanding of all markets, some broad rules of thumb are needed.
One possible such rule is to follow a presumption that price discrimination by dominant firms
aimed at final consumers should be permitted. Obviously, there are many examples where
such price discrimination harms consumers and welfare, but given the detailed information
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required to decide on this, and given that rules against excessive pricing remain available in
some jurisdictions for use with particularly egregious cases, it seems sensible to give firms
the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, continued detailed scrutiny of cases involving
selective price cuts and cases involving margin squeeze–which can be broadly interpreted
as price discrimination–is important.
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